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In the transitional period, with the implement of political and economic reform, 
 China’s state-society relations are becoming more and more differentiated. The state 
begins to comply market rule and gradually reduces the economic administrative 
intervention, hence the market dominates the resource allocation. Meanwhile, the 
government has started to reduce the manipulation on society, which lead to the 
release of social freedom and independence. Urbanization is an important 
development strategy of state. With the development of urbanization, the government 
implements large-scale land acquisition. To obtain the rural collective land ownership, 
which result in the emergence of large numbers of “nail house”, even worse “the 
landless group incidents”all over the country. However, at the mean time, some 
grassroots government always takes emergency measures that sometimes results in 
damage of the governments image, lose of the people’s trust in governments or tense 
state-society relations. This study reviews the state-society relation theory of China 
and abroad, including the state-society relations monism of abroad in ancient time, the 
state-society relation dualism in modern times, and the thirds theory in modern times. 
This study also review the two theory of “totalitariansm” and “overall society” in the 
planned economy period, and the jungle theory in transitional period. The study 
review the literature of farmer fight from three levels the state, the actor and the 
society, and the literature of the government fight against farmers. Based on this, this 
study is a case study under the topic of “Study on the strategy of grassroots 
government to fight against farmers in land requisition”. The practical significance of 
this study is to discover the true face of grassroots government and use the theory to 
explain the state-society relations in China’s transitional periad. The theoretical 
significance of this paper is to provide a supplement to the academic resources of 
state-society relations. The innovative part of the study is the particular efforts of 















government officials, compesating the lack of relevant material in the government 
fighting against farmers, and validating the conclusion that is the state-society 
relations in transitional period is “srong state-weak society”. 
    The study use the state-society relations theory as the core theory, uses the 
“process-event analysis” which is suitabel for micro, dynamic case study, and selects 
the development zone as the research unit, and selects the development zone of 
Tian-Yang as the field. The study uses the interview method, discussion method and 
participant observation to carry out the field research in tian-yang. Successfully 
obtaintry the factnal material of “the strategy of grassroots government to fight 
against farmers in land requisition” in Tian-Yang. The content framework of the study 
is mainly divided into three parts, six chapters. The first part is the first chapter, 
include the research background, research questions and theory review and literature, 
etc.. The second part covers the cases, including the second to fifth chapter, among 
which, the second chapter include the research design, the third chapter to the fifth 
chapter respectively include “Breaking-action”, “Dog-Fighting” and “Ending Action”. 
The third part, namely chapter 6, is the conclusion of “the strategy of grassroots 
government to fight against farmers in land requisition”. This research in accordance 
with the narrative of  “diachronic and coexistence”, divide the event of “the strategy 
of grassroots government to fight against farmers in land requisition” into three stages 
for describing. The first stage is pre-requisition stage, the study describes 
emphatically how the grassroots government of Tian-yang carries out low cost, low 
risk and tentative “flexible” strategy, trying to “brink” the land requisition of 
Tian-yang development zone. The second stage is the land requisiting, the study 
mainly descripts how the farmers of Tian-yang development zone in face of the loss in 
political rights and economic interests, based on the survival and development, begin 
to carry out all kinds of fights, to “Dog-Fighting” with the grassroots government, and 
to maintain the land usufruct. The third stage is the pass-requisition after, mainly 
describe how the grassroots government improve, the efficiency of land requisition, 
carry out the “rigid” “Ending Action” for the “nail households” and “ground mass 















urbanization. The grassroots government sets up “preferential incentives” to mobilize 
the enthusiasm and initiative of farmers, implements the strategy of poverty-alleviat, 
in order to make people agree to the land requisition system. Grassroots government 
also strengthens the “state agent” role of the village cadres, asks  village cadres to set 
examles in land requisition, and takes advantages of the countryside social 
relationship to implement the “soft” compulsory mobilization. On the basis of the 
“soft strategy”, the grassroots government takes “flexible” action on the land 
requisition procedure, by replacly the signing between grassroots government and 
village collective economic organizations with that between the grassroot goverment 
and village officers, so as to improve the efficiency of land requisition. The farmers of 
Tian-yang finds that their political rights such as the right of participation and right of 
acknowledgy as well as the compensation and resettlement, social security and other 
economic interests are infringed.In order to maintain the land usefruct, farmers began 
to make “the weapons of weak ” such as scold, delay, and avoid. The farmers also 
make use of new media network to spread the land requisition information, carry out 
“Public Opinion Fighting”, but the effects are limited. The farmers began to set up 
professional “rights protection team”, to carry out the petition, complaint 
correspondence, invite the media reports, and gain access to lawyer and the court, to 
carry out “Law Fighting”. The individual farmers even get to the construction site to 
carry out the “Body Fighting”, “Death Fighting”, the elderly, women and other 
disadvantaged groups in all villages of Tian-yang also get to the construction site to 
carry out the “Power Fighting”. The face that those weapons of the weak carried out 
by the farmers of Tian-yang development zone, with very limited effect, because the 
farmers lack social capital, and the grass-roots government is powerful in political, 
economic, and cultural resources, so the farmer failes to have substantial impact on 
the  implementation of land requisition system. 
Under the pressure system, the grassroot govermengt of Tian-yang development 
zone, in order to improve the efficiency of land requisition and complete the land 
acquisition targets, begins to use some strategies of forcing farmers to agree to land 















the houses which would be demolished, including threats of zero compensation of 
some farmers’ “illegal” housesr. They also carry out the “law enforcement” action 
against the farmers whose properties has not constructed legally. Second, the grassroot 
government starts to review the legality of the farmer’s professional conduct, 
including threating the farmers that they will ask the industrial and commercial 
households to implement “industrial and commercial law enforcement”, threating 
village cadres that they will ask discipline inspection commission to check the village 
financial management, followed by “insider control ” of village cadres, etc..Finally, 
the grassroots government begin to search the farmers’ misbehaviors “handle”, 
including giving up accusing the ChaoShengHu, carrying out “law enforcement” 
against the farmers patticipating in gambling, identifying the farmers’ marriage 
legitimacy, as well as carrying out the administrative detention punishment to the 
farmer participating power fighting etc. All in all, the grassroots government take the 
“law enforcement” action to “Ending Action” for the land requisition in Tian-yang 
development zone. 
The study, through the case study of “Study on the strategy of grassroots 
government to fight against farmers in land requisition”, basically verifies the 
conclusion that the state-society relations is “strong state-weak society” in China’s 
transitional period. This study find that, the “strong state” in the state-society relations 
mainly reflect the fact that grassroots government not only master the “formal 
authority”, such as the power of land acquisition, the power of decision-making of the 
land requisition compensation and resettlement, and the power of excutive etc., but 
also master the “informal power” in the implement of the land requisition 
compensation and resettlement system, which ensure the land requisition system 
implement succefully. At the same time, the study also argues that the “weak state” in 
state-society relations mainly reflects the fact that farmers not only lose the political 
rights and economic interests, but also can’t get effect from all kinds of fighting 
carried out by themselves, because of their lack of social capital, which make the 
farmer fail to make effect on the land requisition system. The study find that the cause 















of priority of laws regulations and policy, laws and regulations are suppose out weigh 
policy, and policy should serve laws and regulations, but the government adopt 
various methods to use laws and regulations, and make law and regulations to serve 
them. Second, In land requisition of urbanization, the state tax system and the land 
requisition system are not perfect, which makes the state strongly encourage land 
requisition with smaller risk and possibility. Third, China lack organization on behalf 
of diversified interest groups, especially the vulnerable groups such as farmers. The 
lack of social organizations makes the farmers less capable of resisting the “invasion” 
of state, the rights and interests of farmers are not effective guaranteed. Finally, the 
institutional participation channel of china is less available, so more and more farmers 
take informal participation channels to express interest demands. The study suggests 
that the “strong state-strong society” virtuous state society relations model, perhaps 
will become China’s future state-society practice orientation and ideal type of 
relations.  
 
Keywords: land acquisition；grassroots government；fight against；state-society 
relations 
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